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I.-Introduction. 
 
 When the book that will contain these words is released, the Supreme Court of the 
United States may have reached a decision in the Kiobel case and, whatever that result, 
it will undoubtedly constitute a milestone in that country and in the rest of the world 
regarding transnational civil litigations on Human Rights violations. The case is already 
renowned for the significance of what is being decided: whether or not multinational 
corporations are subject to the well-known Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA)2 and the 
future of that Act. Enormous expectations have been created in the media and in the 
interested parties, resulting in any number of positions being made public in the most 
diverse forums including, of course, academic forums.3  
                                                 
1      * Professor of Private International Law, 
Universidad Jaume I de Castellón. This text was developed within the framework of the Proyecto 
Consolider-Ingenio 2010, HURI-AGE, The Age of Rights, CSD2008-0007. This is a more developed 
version of my contribution with the same title in Responsabilidad de las empresas multinacionales y 
derechos humanos: Estado de la cuestión, Various Authors, Universidad de Alcalá, Cátedra de Derechos 
Humanos and Oficina del Defensor del Pueblo (forthcoming). 
2       28 USC Sec. 1350. Also known as the Alien Tort 
Statute (ATS). 
3       One such example is the symposium paper, “A Tort 
Statute with Aliens and Pirates,” Northwestern University School of Law Review, vol. 107, 2012. 
Voluminous information about the judicial vicissitudes of the case can be found, as well, e.g., 
http://www.business-humanrights.org/Categories/ Lawlawsuits/ Lawsuitsregulator yaction/ 
LawsuitsSelectedcases/ShelllawsuitreNigeria. 
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   Meanwhile, Kiobel has been singled out as well by the two staged approach with 
which the Supreme Court has confronted it. Thus, after the Court agreed to hear the 
case, it was first argued in February 2012, addressing the question of whether 
multinational corporations are subject to the mandates of public international law and, 
therefore, to ATCA. The Court was convened on those terms, and that was how the case 
was understood by legal experts, including this author.4 At the beginning of March, 
however, the High Court, contrary to habitual procedure, announced another hearing. 
The second hearing, held on 1 October 2012, focused on an analysis of the 
extraterritorial application of ATCA. It is also worth noting that the Supreme Court, 
sua sponte, raised this question, even though it was only addressed marginally in legal 
commentaries and the parties had not made special mention of it. This is not to suggest 
that the High Court exceeded the scope of its authority, since it enjoys practically 
limitless powers, but the manner in which the Court is exercising its authority in this 
case is certainly surprising. What is most surprising is the focus the Court has taken in a 
case that was originally, as I have said, presented on the basis of very different 
principles. ATCA and its application have suddenly been thrown into the murky and 
tempestuous ocean of the extraterritoriality of laws, and several Justices, in the 
aforementioned October 1, 2012 hearing, presented such fearsome creatures as 
reciprocity or the exhaustion of local remedies,5 very rarely seen in litigations based on 
that statute. 
   In any case, this is the principal playing field as defined by the Supreme Court, so we 
must confine ourselves to it. Personally, this field is not unfamiliar to me; quite the 
opposite. For many years, this has been one of the primary focuses of my research, 
reflected in varied publications on diverse areas of legislation. But I must admit that, 
having focused the majority of my energies for more than a decade on the field of 
Human Rights, I did not expect to find myself precisely at this point, addressing the 
aforementioned extraterritoriality of laws. Having also dedicated a good deal of 
attention over the years to ATCA and its application, I must state that, in my opinion, it 
does not belong to the sphere of extraterritoriality. This will be the leitmotiv of my 
                                                 
4       See my “Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Corp. y los litigios 
transnacionales sobre Derechos Humanos,” Papeles el Tiempo de los Derechos, HURI-AGE, Consolider- 
Ingenio 2010, número 4, 2011, 13 pp. 
 5       See, e.g., CHILDRESS, T., “What Will the 
Supreme Court Do With the Alien Tort Statute?” http://conflictoflaws.net/2012/what-will-the-supreme-
court-do-with-the-alien-tort-statute/. The question of local remedies had been raised in the Supplemental 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Partial Support of Affirmance, June 2012, pp. 22-24. 
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modest contribution in this paper. Now that I have concluded my introductory remarks, 
I will move on to Section II, a brief sampling meant as a reminder of what we generally 
mean when we discuss problems of extraterritoriality. In Section III, I will focus my 
attention on the resolution of these types of torts from the point of view of private 
international law. Finally, Section IV will provide some brief conclusions. Let us begin. 
 
II.-Aide-Mémoire on Conflicts of Extraterritoriality. 
   If we think about the United States and the extraterritoriality of laws, the association 
of ideas is immediate: conflicts on multiple levels. Conflicts that reveal power plays, 
unilateral actions, hegemonic aspirations or, more starkly, the quest for Empire.6 
   One good example would be the attempt to defend the American market by 
influencing the regulation of free competition and securities. This particular example is 
well known, 7 in part because it provoked the extremely unusual Blocking Laws, whose 
                                                 
6       This is addressed, for example, in the studies by 
MARGOLIES, D.S., “The ‘Ill-Defined Fiction’ of Extraterritoriality and Sovereign Exception in Late 
Nineteenth Century U.S. Foreign Relations,” Southwestern Law Review, vol. 40, 2011, pp. 575-603 and 
RAUSTIALA, K., “Empire and Extraterritoriality in 20th Century America,” http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1831773, 19 pp. These imperialistic ambitions are rejected on the 
European side of the Atlantic; see, e.g., the study by GRISEL, G., “La protection des personnes privées 
des Etats européens contre l’application extraterritoriale excessive du droit américain,” in DONGOIS, N. 
and KILLIAS, M. (eds.), L’americanisation des droits suisses et continentaux, Schultess, Zürich, 2006, 
pp. 321-355. The number of studies about extraterritoriality is, simply put, enormous. Among the most 
recent, I will highlight, for example, the brilliant piece by STIGALL, D. E., “International Law and 
Limitations on the Exercise of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in U.S. Domestic Law,” Hastings International 
and Comparative Law Review, vol. 35, 2012, pp. 323-382. Also, articles by BENNET, T. B., “The Canon 
at the Water’s Edge,” New York University Law Review, vol. 87, 2012, pp. 101-139; KNOX, J. H., “A 
Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality,” American Journal of International Law, vol. 104, 2010, pp. 
351-396 and COLANGELO, A. J., “A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality,” Virginia Law Review, 
vol. 97, 2011, pp. 1019-1109. Relating Human Rights to the extraterritoriality of laws, see also, among 
others: AUGENSTEIN, D. and KINLEY, D., “When Human Rights ‘Responsibilities’ Become ‘Duties’: 
The Extra-Territorial Obligations of States that Bind Corporations,” Sydney Law School, Legal Studies 
Research Paper, nº. 12/71, September 2012, 16 pp. Specifically regarding the Alien Tort Statute, see, 
e.g., KIRSCHNER, J. A., “Why is the U.S. Abdicating the Policing of Multinational Corporations to 
Europe?: Extraterritorialism, Sovereignty and the Alien Tort Statute,” University of Cambridge, Faculty 
of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, nº 16/2012, June 2012, 69 pp.; BELLIA, A. J. (Jr.) and 
CLARK, B. R., “Kiobel, Subject Matter Jurisdiction and the Alien Tort Statute,” http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2008254; BRADLEY, C. A., “Agora: Kiobel. Attorney General Bradford’s Opinion and the 
Alien Tort Statute,” American Journal of International Law, vol. 106, 2012, pp. 1-22 and FIECHTER, M. 
K., “Extraterritorial Application of the Alien Tort Statute: The Effect of Morrison v. National Australia 
Bank, Ltd. on Future Litigation,” Iowa Law Review, vol. 97, 2012, pp. 959-979. Finally, to study on more 
aspects, see, e.g., ELLIS, J., “Extraterritorial Exercise of Jurisdiction for Environmental Protection: 
Addressing Fairness Concerns,” Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 25, 2012, pp. 397-414 ; 
CLOPTON, Z. D., “Bowman Lives: The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Criminal Law After 
Morrison v. National Australia Bank,” NYU Annual Survey of American Law, vol. 67, 2011, pp. 137-194 
and FAIRGRIEVE, D. and LEIN, E., Extraterritoriality and Collective Redress, Oxford U. Press, 2012. 
7       The literature on this matter is very extensive. 
Among the most recent regarding the Antitrust sector, see, e.g., the article by STIGALL, D. E., op. cit, 
pp. 341-347, and my article entitled “Sobre la International Comity en el sistema de Dº internacional 
privado de los Estados Unidos,” Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales, Vol. 19, 2010, 16 pp.; 
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enactment by various countries, natural economic partners of the United States, had no 
purpose other than to thwart the effects of the extraterritorial application of the laws of 
the United States, which is significant.8 Perhaps, however, the paradigm of the type of 
extraterritoriality that blocks normal coexistence between nations and their legal 
mandates is to be found in the area of international economic sanctions. The United 
States is, once again, very strongly equipped with these legal weapons; there are few 
countries in the world that have not, at some point or another, suffered its fearsome 
consequences.9 Let me mention three examples in various realms that will help clarify 
this point. 
   The first concerns commercial interests and the opening of foreign markets, according 
to Section 301 et seq. of the United States Trade Act of 1974, and the noteworthy 
reforms of the Trade Act of 1988.10 It is important to remember that these measures led 
to the notorious “Super 301,” 11 supported by a series of lists establishing priorities 
regarding the identification of trade barriers and the countries responsible for them. If 
these countries failed to reach an agreement with the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR), they were exposed to a wide range of retaliatory measures, 
such as the suspension of concessions, the imposition of tariffs, and/or restrictions on 
importation, on goods and services. These measures were imposed on nations in an 
indiscriminate manner – whether or not they were responsible, regardless the economic 
sectors affected. This system, in force in broad strokes since 1974, was strengthened by 
the “Super 301,” which some people at that time classified as an “atomic weapon in the 
commercial arena.” It allowed for a transfer of the power that was generally controlled 
by the President of the United States to the aforementioned USTR and encouraged 
                                                                                                                                               
also the article by SRINIVASAN, A., “Redressing International Antitrust Agreements - An Analysis of 
Extraterritorial Antitrust Enforcement,” Research Paper for the Competition Commission of India, 
January, 2012, 38 pp., http://www.cci.gov.in/images/media/ ResearchReports/ Adhitya 30jan2012.pdf. 
Regarding the securities market and its regulation, among others, see, e.g., BRILMAYER, L., “The New 
Extraterritoriality: Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Legislative Supremacy, and the Presumption 
Against Extraterritorial Application of American Law,” Southwestern Law Review, vol. 40, 2011, pp. 
655-686; KNOX, J. H., “The Unpredictable Presumption Against Extraterritoriality,” ibidem, pp. 635-
653; DODGE, W. S., “Morrison’s Effects Test,” ibidem, pp. 687-696 and FOX, M. B., “Securities Class 
Actions Against Foreign Issuers,” Stanford Law Review, vol. 64, 2012, pp. 1173-1276. 
8      On these issues, see, e.g., the study by LOWE, A. 
V., “Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The British Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980,” 
American Journal of International Law, vol. 75, 1981, pp. 257- 282. 
9       In general, see, e.g., my study “Les sanctions 
économiques internationales: un essay de synthèse,” Various Authors, Impérialisme et Chauvinisme 
Juridiques, rapports présentés au colloque à l’occassion du 20me. Anniversaire de L’Institut Suisse de 
Droit Comparé, Schultess, Zurich, 2004, pp. 309-319. 
10       Codified in 19 U.S.C. 2411 et seq. (1988). 
11       19 U.S.C. 2420. 
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action: measures were taken, the time frame for action was cut, authority was granted to 
monitor the concessions that foreign governments afforded the United States regarding 
the removal of trade barriers or the awarding of compensation, etc. This system was, in 
the end, a tremendous negotiating weapon because of its power to intimidate. 
Furthermore, it should not, in my opinion, be dissociated from the very genesis of the 
GATT/WTO system, with which it has maintained a complex relationship,12 with 
milestones like the well-known Kodak/Fuji case.13 
   For my second example, I shift from commercial politics to international politics and 
strategic considerations. The crucial importance of the case to which I am referring, the 
Siberian Gas Pipeline, is reflected in the voluminousness of the literature.14 In 1982, the 
United States directed powerful export control regulations at the Soviet Union as an 
apparent response to the imposition of martial law in Poland, placing an embargo on 
products and technology used for the construction of a natural gas pipeline between the 
Soviet Union and Western Europe. But the embargo also held hostage the European 
companies that, bound by previous contracts, were using United States parts that 
carried no restrictions when they were acquired. This was the heights of 
extraterritoriality and created enormous discontent on both sides of the Atlantic. On the 
European side, for example, the need to search for alternatives to the traditional 
methods of supplying energy, well established since the 1973 crisis, led them, not 
unreasonably, to see the goals of United States sanctions as completely foreign to their 
plans and interests. For the United States, on the other hand, Europe was preparing to 
hand their archenemy, the Soviet Union, enormous sums of money in exchange for gas 
supplies, money that could even be used to reinforce the Soviet empire’s military 
strength. It also raised the underlying, non-trivial question of allowing European 
dependence on the Soviet empire in a matter as vital as energy supplies. In this 
situation, very costly in terms of the tensions created between allies, someone had to 
give in, and in the end it was the United States, which lifted sanctions and eased the 
                                                 
12       Allow me to mention my text, Las vías de solución 
de los conflictos de extraterritorialidad, Eurolex, Madrid, 2001, pp. 176-184. 
13       Ibidem, pp. 184-192. In addition, see, e.g., 
VÁZQUEZ, C. M., “Trade Sanctions and Human Rights: Past, Present and Future,” Journal of 
International Economic Law, vol. 6, 2003, pp. 797-839.  
14      On all these matters, see, e.g., AUDIT, B., 
“Extraterritorialité et commerce international. L’affaire du gazoduc sibèrien,” Revue Critique, 1983, pp. 
401-434. 
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penalties imposed against certain European subsidiaries of American corporations.15 
Following this situation, the United States seemed to reflect on the disadvantages of 
taking unilateral action and prioritized the reaching of agreements. For example, they 
revitalized a system regarding the transfer of strategic technology called COCOM 
which, after the fall of the Eastern Block, gave way to its successor, known as the 
Wassenaar Arrangement.16 
   Lastly, and also related to sanctions, we have a festering problem that has only been 
resolved in a partial and limited fashion by way of an agreement between certain 
countries. I am referring to the dense body of regulations and their application that 
constitute what is called the Cuban Embargo, always controlled by the United States 
and extensively rejected by the international community, as seen by the numerous 
condemnations supported by hefty majorities in the General Assembly of the United 
Nations. These condemnations have not, apparently, made much of an impression on 
the will of the United States. Within that body of regulations, we can take note of what 
is perhaps one of the most significant elements, the notorious Helms-Burton Act.17 For 
now, I will simply emphasize the fact that, in spite of addressing various issues, as A. 
W. Lowenfeld has correctly pointed out, its true goal is to establish a secondary boycott, 
“to affect the behavior of persons in third countries who have done or are considering 
doing business in or with Cuba.”18 It is important to remember that this, to a large 
extent, led to the European Union’s decision to announce a Blocking Regulation, 
Council Regulation 2271/96, and to initiate procedures for the establishment of a 
Special Group within GATT/WTO for solving controversies, even if they desisted after 
the April 11, 1997 Memorandum of Understanding with the United States.19  
                                                 
15       In light of what is called game theory, some people 
have interpreted this way the United States extricated itself from the problem as a typical manifestation of 
the prisoner’s dilemma; see, e.g., SCHUSTER, G., “Extraterritoriality of Securities Laws: An Economic 
Analysis of Jurisdictional Conflicts,” Law and Policy in International Business, vol. 26, 1994, p. 200. 
16       On this matter, see, e.g., my “Control de la 
transferencia de tecnología de interés estratégico en el ámbito de la defensa: Proyección del Derecho 
comunitario y español,” in Ministerio de Defensa, Normativa reguladora del militar profesional en el 
inicio del siglo XX y otros estudios jurídico militares, Madrid, 2001, pp. 791-804. 
17       Public Law 104-14, 110 Stat 785, 22 U.S.C. et seq., 
6021-91. On this question, see, e.g., SOLÍS, A.M., “The Long Arm of U.S. Law: The Helms-Burton 
Act,” Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review, vol. 19, 1997, pp. 709-741 and 
my study, “Les sanctions…,” op. cit., pp. 318-319. 
18       See “Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act,” 
American Journal of International Law, vol. 90, 1996, pp. 419 and 427. 
19       On this question, see, e.g., SMITS, S. and VAN 
DEN BORGH, K., “The EU-US Compromise on the Helms-Burton and D’Amato Acts,” American 
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   It is in the face of this common memory of the extraterritoriality of United States 
laws, of which I have made only the briefest and most superficial of mentions, that the 
adversaries of the Alien Tort Claims Act studiously mention the supposed legal 
imperialism to which its practice will lead. This is an attempt to get a rise out of people, 
placing the issue into a troubled environment that sparks numerous negative memories 
for many people. To my point of view, these actions are truly unusual. It is self-evident 
that through the practice we have mentioned, the United States has abandoned its 
notorious exceptionalism in the area of Human Rights to become champions of 
universalism.20 Yet there are those here who critique them for it! In the face of this fact, 
I will conclude the present Section with a humorous note, if you will indulge me, 
echoing a rather caustic and skeptical notice that appears from time to time in academic 
circles: “No good deed shall go unpunished.” 
 
III.-Special Torts. 
   While the first of what I am calling the two stages of the Kiobel case was taking place, 
in other words, when the charge was to ascertain whether multinational corporations are 
subject to the mandates of public international law and, therefore, to ATCA, I believe it 
was logical for the law of foreign legal transactions to remain on the back burner. 
However, once the theme of the extraterritoriality of laws was raised, this was no longer 
the case. Still, based on most of what we have seen, private international law, unless I 
am missing something, continues to remain in the shadows of the case. I believe this 
makes it difficult to get a clear picture of the issue at hand. In extraterritoriality in 
general, both facets of international law converge, as is obviously the case in 
transnational civil litigations on Human Rights, such as Kiobel, where the discipline that 
is called Conflict of Laws also has a lot to tell us. This is my principal thesis in this 
article, which corresponds to the main themes of my Report to the “Group of Study on 
                                                                                                                                               
Journal of International Law, vol. 93, 1999, pp. 227 et seq. The formidable sanction apparatus of the U.S. 
continues to grow, although there are times when it is inscribed in the context of collective actions in the 
face of countries designed as offenders by the international community; see, e.g.,, Various Authors, 15 
October 2012, United States: Foreign Subsidiaries of US Corporations Now Fully Subject to Iranian 
Sanctions, http://www.steptoe.com /publications-8440.html. See also, Various Authors, 13 November 
2012, United States: Increasing “Extraterritorial” Application of U.S. Trade Control Laws to Non-U.S. 
Businesses, http://www.mondaq.com/ unitedstates/article.asp?articleid=206122&print=1. 
20       See, in general, BRADFORD, A. and POSNER, E. 
A., “Universal Exceptionalism in International Law,” Harvard International Law Journal, vol. 52, 2011, 
pp. 2-54. 
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Private International Law and Human Rights,” that was adopted by it and then 
published in the “Conflict of Laws.” blog21 
   I would like to emphasize that the practice of United States federal courts regarding 
ATCA and the procedures related to the consideration and resolution of cases match the 
practices that are generally followed regarding torts that come from heterogeneous legal 
environments or Sister States or, more pertinently to ATCA, those that have 
international elements, foreign plaintiffs -sine qua non-, a foreign locus of tort action, 
etc. There is nothing unusual, therefore, in litigations based on ATCA, and that is what 
the prestigious United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit observed when it 
gave new life to this venerable piece of legislation in its resolution of the famous 
Filártiga case: “It is not extraordinary for a court to adjudicate a tort claim arising 
outside of its territorial jurisdiction. A state or nation has a legitimate interest in the 
orderly resolution of disputes among those within its borders, and where the lex loci 
delicti commissi is applied, it is an expression of comity to give effect to the laws of the 
state where the wrong occurred.”22 In support of this argument, the Court turned to 
noted precedents, such as the authority of Lord Mansfield in his sentence in Mostyn v. 
Fabrigas and, by extension, the established and very relevant practice under British 
jurisdiction when confronting the solution to international torts through private 
international law, the Conflict of Laws. 
   This is, I believe, a very logical way of addressing these matters. In what sense does 
federal court procedure imply a rebuke of public international law that would indicate, 
according to some people, an unacceptable extraterritoriality on the part of the United 
States? Are we talking about excesses in these litigations when it comes to exercising 
their jurisdiction to execute? This does not seem to be the case; in the already extensive 
number of litigations based on ATCA, that jurisdiction has not provoked greater 
controversies than those that sporadically arise in any other area. Is it a question, then, 
of problems regarding jurisdiction to adjudicate or jurisdiction to prescribe? I will 
discuss both issues. 
   Regarding jurisdiction to adjudicate, it seems like a stretch to present it according to 
the model of extraterritoriality and to give extraterritoriality the negative twist that is 
being attempted here. When we talk about extraterritoriality, we think primarily about 
                                                 
21       With contributions by the members of the Group. It 
can be found at http://conflictoflaws.net/2012/ats-and-extraterritoriality-a-point-of-view/. 
22       Filartiga v. Pena Irala, 630 F. 2d 876 (2d. Cir. 
1980). 
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mandates to do or not to do, which are part of sustantive law. There is an attempt to 
project these mandates – related, in this case, to serious Human Rights violations 
perpetrated in other countries - beyond the physical framework of power connected to 
state sovereignty, not to the assumption of jurisdiction on the part of its courts. In 
addition and without a doubt, ATCA is a jurisdictional statute, as was clearly 
established by the Supreme Court itself in its Sosa decision.23 Regardless, there are 
those who criticize the United States for perpetrating an eventual excess of jurisdiction 
here, under the label of universal jurisdiction, assimilating it to extraterritoriality. This 
is the opinion of Germany, for example, when, in the amicus curiae it presented to the 
High Court in Kiobel, it claims that the Supreme Court should “instruct the lower courts 
that the power to adjudicate should only be exercised in ATCA cases brought by foreign 
plaintiffs against foreign corporate defendants concerning foreign activities where there 
is no possibility for the foreign plaintiff to pursue the matter in another jurisdiction with 
a greater nexus.”24 
   For my part, I believe that Germany’s approach, with all due respect, is not consistent 
with private international law or with the Law of Nations. The fundamental historic 
development of private international law is based on the diversity of systems of 
international jurisdiction to adjudicate. Furthermore, as Horatia Muir Watt correctly 
indicates, touching specifically on Kiobel, the applicable law is based on “engineering 
windows within domestic law in order to import norms from other (foreign or 
international) legal systems.”25 Therefore, the jurisdiction to adjudicate of the United 
States, exercised through its courts, does not have to coincide with the criteria of other 
countries or to cede jurisdiction to those who are supposedly more connected in this or 
any other matter. The only thing that can be demanded, whether we are discussing the 
jurisdiction of the United States or any other country, is that jurisdiction be exercised in 
a reasonable manner when there is sufficient nexus with the State claiming it, such as, 
for example, the criteria gathered in Section 421 of the Restatement of the Law Third, 
The Foreign Relations Law of the United States. If these or similar criteria are fulfilled 
and, of course, apart from conventional action, I believe that international law – which 
provided the basis for the establishment of the cited Restatement III – will be satisfied 
                                                 
23       542 U.S. at 724 (2004). 
24       See Brief of the Federal Republic of Germany as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491 (U.S. Feb. 
2, 2012). 
25       “Private International Law Beyond the Schism,” 
Transnational Legal Theory, vol. 2, 2011, p. 367. 
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as it stands now26. My belief on this matter is confirmed by the application of ATS in 
this area since, to the extent of my knowledge, there have been very few cases in which 
the defendants have fought the aforementioned jurisdiction to adjudicate of the United 
States courts, not including Forum Non Conveniens, which is based on other 
considerations. 
Therefore, going a step further, taking into account United States jurisdiction to 
prescribe based on ATCA, it does not seem, in my opinion and in contrast to what some 
people claim, that applying this statute to foreign nationals for actions taken abroad 
without nexus to the United States violates international law. In the previous Section, 
we saw some examples of what truly can be considered expressions of legal imperialism 
and serious conflicts of extraterritoriality. Apart from all of that, with the development 
of litigations based on ATCA, we must not forget that the United States, with all the 
guarantees of one of the best judicial systems in the world, has sent to the international 
community very potent messages of an active commitment to the defense of Human 
Rights. One such example comes from the ruling made by the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit in their September 14, 2000 decision regarding Forum Non Conveniens 
in Wiwa. By providing a forum for the victims of atrocities, which stir any conscience 
worthy of that name - as Justice Breyer revealed, much to his credit, in the first appeal 
hearing on Kiobel - and by upholding the mandates of international law through its own 
channels, the United States towers over its peers in the protection of the aforementioned 
rights. What we have here is not imposition, but an outstanding shouldering of 
responsibilities and leadership. They reveal not a desire to dominate, but to show 
solidarity with the human race. There is no selfishness, but a shining example of the 
preservation of inalienable rights and, therefore, of the supreme value of peace, the 
ultimate reason for the existence of an international order. Through ATCA, moreover, 
the United States provides an optimal example of dédoublement fonctionnel or role 
splitting that constitutes one of the fundamental contributions of the valuable legacy of 
the great Georges Scelle. The eminent Antonio Cassese, for example, saw the use that 
                                                 
26       On this issue, see, e.g., Supplemental Brief of Amici 
Curiae German Institute for Human Rights and International Law Experts in Support of Petitioners, 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. No. 10-1491 (U.S. June 13, 2012), pp. 4-12. In general, see also 
MICHAELS, R., Public and Private International Law: German Views on Global Issues, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1259933. 
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was being made of that piece of legislation in these precise terms.27 What then remains 
of the critiques of imperialism and extraterritoriality? Little, in truth, in my opinion. 
   Let us, then, that private international law and its wisdom of many centuries do their 
work. This is what, in the end, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit of the United 
States advocated in Filártiga. All that, without ignoring that, in the case of ATCA, it is 
a question of special torts, to the extent, for example, to which the norm reserving 
federal courts’ jurisdiction to adjudicate is supported by the Law of Nations and a 
reduced set of  conducts contrary to Jus Cogens, just as the Sosa precedent established. 
Or that when it is time to determine the choice of law, these same courts, following the 
cited precedent, can always choose federal common law, which has been integrating the 
mandates of public international law. I say “choose,” because they are allowed to apply, 
according to the conflict of laws or the choice of law to which they should be subject, a 
foreign law, e.g., the law where the action took place. Being a special tort does not, in 
the end, mean exclusion, but the opportunity to make public and private international 
law work together. Which always ennobles both of them. 
 
IV.-Final Reflections. 
   As I said at the beginning of this document, which I am concluding before the start of 
calendar year 2013, I do not know if its publication in the site indicated will have been 
preceded by the Kiobel decision. I cannot, in any case, hazard a guess at the solution the 
High Court will take. This select group of people, who are among the most powerful 
and influential in the world, can surprise us; in fact, they do so with relative frequency. 
We can recall, for example, when Chief Justice Roberts broke with the solid 
conservative block to which he belongs, thus casting the deciding vote in favor of 
upholding President Obama’s significant health care reform. I will not, therefore, make 
predictions, except one: if the United States Supreme Court decides in the end to 
damage or seriously undermine what I have until now qualified as a shining example in 
the fight for Human Rights, the fight regarding international litigations will, without a 
shadow of a doubt, continue. And it will do so before the courts of the aforementioned 
                                                 
27       See Cassese’s “Remarks on Scelle’s Theory of 
‘Role Splitting’ (dédoublement fonctionnel) in International Law,” European Journal of International 
Law, vol. 1, 1990, pp. 230. In general, see, e.g., SCHNEEBAUM, S.M., “What Is This Case Doing Here? 
Human Rights Litigation in the Courts of the United States,” Case Western Reserve Journal of 
International Law, vol. 44, 2011, pp. 183-203. 
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Sister States28 or the courts of the European nations, which are now generating relief 
jurisprudence29 in order to create their own examples of what is occurring these days, 
seemingly increasing across the length and breadth of the globe. There is no choice in 
this matter. Leaving the field open to the excesses of multinational corporations can 
only bring us closer to the moment that is described in the unsettling, and hopefully not 
prophetic, poem that Sara Teasdale wrote about the supreme Holocaust, the one that 
unites all the holocausts that are continuously produced in the shadows of ignorance and 
forgetfulness: 
  “There will come soft rains and the smell of the ground, 
And swallows circling with their shimmering sound; 
And frogs in the pools, singing at night, 
And wild plum trees in tremulous white, 
Robins will wear their feathery fire, 
Whistling their whims on a low fence-wire; 
And not one will know of the war, not one 
Will care at last when it is done. 
Not one would mind, neither bird nor tree, 
If mankind perished utterly; 
And Spring herself, when she woke at dawn, 
Would scarcely know that we were gone.” 
 
                                                 
28       See, e.g., PARRISH, A.L., An Emerging Trend?: 
State Court International Human Rights Litigation, found in http://ssrn.com/abstract=2125574. 
29       On all these issues, see, e.g., the monumental work 
by ENNEKING, L.F.H., Foreign Direct Liability and Beyond, The Hague, Eleven, 2012. 
